I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 6 March 2026, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands dismissed Antrix’s appeal in cassation, leaving undisturbed the Hague Court of Appeal’s judgment dated 17 December 2024. The decision did not interfere with the leave granted to Devas by the Court of Appeal to enforce the ICC Award against Antrix in the Netherlands.
2. The Supreme Court’s decision is significant as it upholds the leave to enforce an award already set aside by the seat court e.,the Delhi High Court. The Dutch court has joined the French court in sustaining the life of the Devas ICC Award notwithstanding its annulment at the seat.
3. As we explain below, the Dutch court’s ruling is particularly interesting as the Court of Appeal found that the Indian courts’ rulings indicate a bias to the detriment of Devas^[2].Consequently, the Court of Appeal held that the annulment ruling (along with the connected rulings in the liquidation proceedings) cannot be recognised in the Netherlands, and therefore there was no ground to refuse enforcement.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Devas Agreement and the ICC Award

4. On 28 January 2005, Devas Multimedia Private Limited (“Devas”) and Antrix Corporation Limited, the commercial and marketing arm of the Indian Space Research Organisation and the Department of Space (“Antrix”), entered into an agreement for the lease of space segment capacity on ISRO/Antrix S-Band spacecraft by Devas (“Devas Agreement”). Under the Devas Agreement, Antrix was to procure, launch and operate satellites and lease S-band capacity to Devas for the provision of multimedia and broadband services in India. The Devas Agreement was governed by Indian law and provided for the parties to refer their disputes to a New Delhi seated arbitration by a three-member tribunal under the ICC or UNCITRAL Rules^[3].
5. On 17 February 2011, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security decided that S-band spectrum would not be made available to Antrix for commercial use. Pursuant to the same and at the Department of Space’s direction, on 25 February 2011, Antrix terminated the Devas Agreement by invoking force majeure.
6. On 1 July 2011, Devas commenced ICC arbitration. By a final award dated 14 September 2015, the tribunal rejected Antrix’s force majeuredefence and awarded Devas damages of USD 562.5 million along with interest (“ICC Award”).

B. Actions in India: Criminal investigations, liquidation proceedings, and set aside proceedings

7. The dispute soon moved beyond the arbitral proceedings themselves.
8. From March 2015 onwards, the Indian agencies commenced investigations into alleged fraud committed in the formation and execution of the Devas Agreement and lodged criminal complaints under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. As on the date of the decision of the Court of Appeal, there were no criminal convictions.
9. On 18 January 2021, Antrix filed a petition before the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) to wind up Devas on the ground that it had been incorporated and run fraudulently. Antrix’s petition was to liquidate its creditor (to whom it owed half a billion dollars under the ICC Award) as there was alleged fraud surrounding the Devas Agreement. Antrix pointed out that the ICC Award qualified as an outgrowth of this fraud (this submission was not raised in the arbitration)^[4].Antrix’s petition was followed by the appointment of a provisional liquidator the next day by the NCLT. Thereafter, on 25 May 2021, the NCLT ordered liquidation^[5], and directed the liquidator to take expeditious steps to liquidate Devas “in order to prevent it from perpetuating its fraudulent activities and abusing the process of law in enforcing the ICC Award.” The NCLT’s decision was upheld by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal on 8 September 2021,^[6] and the Supreme Court of India on 17 January 2022^[7] (“Liquidation Ruling”).
10. On 19 November 2015, Antrix filed an application to set aside the ICC Award. On 4 November 2020, the Supreme Court of India suspended the enforcement of the ICC Award, relying on the amendment (passed on the same day) retroactively amending the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ^[8] and directed inter alia that the set aside application should be heard by the Delhi High Court^[9].
11. Thereafter, on 29 August 2022, the Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court set aside the ICC Award on grounds of patent illegality, fraud, and conflict with Indian public policy.^[10] In March 2023, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court affirmed that decision, concluding that the finding given in the liquidation proceedings that there had been fraud is binding between the parties in view of the principles of res judicata^[11]. On 6 October 2023, the Supreme Court of India declined further interference with the Division Bench’s judgment (“Annulment Ruling”)^[12].

C. The Collection Services Agreement

1. Contemporaneously, on 2 February 2018, Devas and its Delaware subsidiary, Devas Multimedia America Inc. (“DMAI”), entered into a Collection Services Agreement (“CSA”), under which DMAI was authorised to take all steps necessary to protect, defend and enforce the ICC Award in return for a share of recoveries^[13].The CSA also provided that DMAI will follow Devas’ instructions. The CSA was governed by Delaware law.
2. Pursuant to the Liquidation Ruling, the liquidator instructed DMAI to cease all activities under the CSA and also dismissed Devas’ lawyers in the annulment proceedings.

D. The proceedings before the Dutch courts

1. The CSA became the basis on which DMAI sought to enforce the ICC Award in the Netherlands. In October 2021, DMAI applied to the Interim Injunction Judge at the District Court of the Hague for exequatur (leave to enforce the ICC Award in the Netherlands). The District Court held DMAI’s initiation of proceedings inadmissible as it found that the Liquidation Ruling can be recognised in the Netherlands. Consequently, the liquidator had exclusive authority and its instruction to DMAI (see [13] above) would mean that DMAI is no longer authorised to act under the CSA. Thereafter, DMAI appealed the decision before the Hague Court of Appeal.

III. THE HAGUE COURT OF APPEAL DECISION

15. With respect to DMAI’s ability to seek leave to enforce the ICC Award in its own name: Before the Court of Appeal, Antrix’s objection was that DMAI could not seek enforcement in the Netherlands because the CSA was invalid and, even if valid, did not authorise DMAI to proceed in its own name (including as DMAI was not a party to the arbitration), as the CSA only allows DMAI to perform debt collection activities^[14].
16. Since the CSA was governed by Delaware law, the Court of Appeal assessed its validity on that basis and rejected Antrix’s objection. The Court of Appeal also held that DMAI’s authority under the CSA to take “all actions necessary” to protect, defend and enforce the award (see [12] above) was wide enough to include seeking leave to enforce before Dutch courts.
17. The Court of Appeal further held that Dutch procedural law permits a party to litigate in its own name on behalf of another. Accordingly, there was no reason to treat enforcement proceedings for a foreign arbitral award differently. DMAI was therefore held competent to maintain the application for exequatur^[15].
18. With respect to recognising the Liquidation Ruling in the Netherlands: Antrix raised an objection that DMAI should be declared inadmissible because of the liquidator’s instruction to DMAI (see [13] above). The Court of Appeal therefore delved into the question of whether the Liquidation Ruling can be recognised in the Netherlands.
19. While determining this question on recognition, as there was no treaty between India and the Netherlands on recognition of judgments, the Court of Appeal applied the framework laid down by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Gazprombank^[16].Under the Gazprombank framework, a foreign judgment is in principle recognised only if (i) the foreign court assumed jurisdiction on a basis generally acceptable by international standards; (ii) the judgment was rendered in proceedings consistent with due process and adequate safeguards; (iii) the recognition is not contrary to Dutch public policy; and (iv) the judgment is not irreconcilable with an earlier recognisable decision between the same parties on the same cause of action^[17].
20. The Court of Appeal’s analysis focused on the second condition of Gazprombank. For the same, the court held that it must test whether the minimum requirements of fair trial as referred to in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) are met. These include the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal, a fair opportunity to present one’s case, proper engagement with the evidence, and reasoned adjudication^[18]. The Court of Appeal emphasised that this enquiry did not involve révision au fond (e., whether the foreign decision is correct). In this enquiry, the Dutch court was to assess whether the foreign judgment, in its making or effect, could be recognised consistently with fundamental Dutch standards of fairness^[19].
21. DMAI argued that the judges in this particular case^[20] were not impartial and independent as the state powers were all working together to prevent the ICC Award from being enforced. In furtherance of its argument, DMAI referred to the sequence of events including initiation of criminal investigations shortly after the ICC arbitration began (see [8] above), the retroactive amendment of the Arbitration Act (see [10] above) after ICC Award being recognised in the USA, and the NCLT’s express instruction to the liquidator to take expeditious steps to prevent it from enforcing the ICC Award (see [9] above)^[21]. The Court of Appeal held this to be insufficient to assess that the judges in the liquidation proceedings were not impartial.
22. The Court of Appeal proceeded to assess the liquidation proceedings and the rulings on their own merits to test whether there was a proper trial with sufficient guarantees in which the requirements of Article 6 ECHR were observed^[22]. The Court of Appeal held that the standards were not met for three reasons:
    • Refusal of document production:Antrix alleged that the Devas Agreement had been concealed from relevant Indian authorities, resulting in allocation of satellite capacity without proper governmental knowledge or approval. In the liquidation proceedings, Devas denied the allegation and sought production of records of governmental meetings and deliberations relating to the Devas Agreement^[23]. In the Court of Appeal’s view, those records could have shown that the relevant authorities were aware of the Devas Agreement and its terms. The Court of Appeal held that the refusal to grant production without cogent reasoning (despite being undisputed that Antrix had or could obtain these documents), while at the same time relying on Devas’ inability to prove the contrary, was therefore a disproportionate restriction on Devas’ ability to answer a central allegation of fraud^[24].
    • Refusal of cross examination: Antrix relied on written statements from its officials to contend that Devas lacked the technical know-how and intellectual property it claimed to possess under the Devas Agreement. Devas sought to cross examine the Antrix officials to disprove their allegations. However, the Indian Courts rejected the request for cross-examination^[25]. The Supreme Court of India justified NCLT and NCLAT’s rejection noting that a party alleging the non-existence of something could not be called upon to prove that non-existence, and that cross examination could not establish the existence of the technology said to be absent^[26]. The Court of Appeal held that Devas should have been given a fair opportunity to test those statements on a matter central to the fraud case. Accordingly, the refusal of cross examination denied Devas a fair hearing and effectively shifted the burden onto it to disprove fraud^[27].
    • Undisputed facts: The NCLT and NCLAT held that fraud could be established on the basis of “undisputed documents” submitted by Antrix, without requiring counter evidence. The Supreme Court of India went further and referred to “undisputed facts” emerging from the documents produced^[28]. The Court of Appeal accepted DMAI’s submission that those matters had in fact been contested throughout the liquidation proceedings. It held that their treatment as undisputed undermined the fairness and impartiality of the process^[29].
23. The above led the court to conclude that the second condition of Gazprombank(see [19] above) was not satisfied and that the liquidation ruling could not be recognised in the Netherlands. Having reached that conclusion, the court did not need to go on to DMAI’s separate arguments on the remaining Gazprombank ^[30]
24. With respect to the recognition of the Annulment Ruling in the Netherlands:The conclusion on the Liquidation Ruling shaped the Court of Appeal’s treatment of the annulment ruling. Antrix argued that Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) barred enforcement because the award had already been set aside at the seat.^[31]  The Court of Appeal rejected that submission. Relying on Maximov/NLMK, it held that Article V(1)(e) does not preclude enforcement in a special case, including where the foreign annulment judgment is itself not recognisable under Dutch private international law as per the framework laid down in Gazprombank^[32]. The Delhi High Court built on the Liquidation Ruling, and treated the findings on fraud in the liquidation proceedings as binding by reason of res judicata. Accordingly, the Delhi High Court annulled the ICC Award on that basis. Since the Liquidation Ruling was not recognised in the Netherlands, the annulment ruling was, in the Court of Appeal’s view, tainted by the same defect. On this basis, the court refused recognition to the annulment ruling as well.
25. Antrix also argued that the enforcement of the ICC Award should be reduced inter aliaon the following grounds: (i) Dutch public policy as the enforcement would entail attaching legal effects to an agreement reached by fraud, (ii) the alleged irregular constitution of the tribunal and arbitral procedure, and (iii) the earlier Indian suspension order as an independent ground to refuse enforcement (see [10] above)^[33]. The Court of Appeal rejected each submission. On public policy, it held that fraud had not been established in a manner recognisable before Dutch courts, particularly since DMAI had disputed the allegation at length and with reasons^[34]. On the constitution of the tribunal and procedure, it held that the arbitral seat was India and that, under Indian law and in light of the Indian Supreme Court’s 2013 interpretation of the arbitration clause, Devas was entitled to choose between the ICC Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules, and that its decision to proceed under the ICC Rules was therefore valid^[35]. On the suspension order, it held that the order had lapsed once the annulment proceedings concluded^[36].
26. The Court of Appeal therefore granted DMAI the leave the enforce the ICC Award.

IV. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NETHERLANDS

27. Antrix carried the matter to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in cassation. By decision dated 6 March 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal under Article 81(1) of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, holding that Antrix’s complaints could not lead to the setting aside of the Court of Appeal’s judgment and required no further reasoning^[37]. The Court of Appeal’s ruling permitting enforcement of the ICC Award in the Netherlands therefore remained undisturbed.

V. CONCLUSION

28. The significance of the Dutch decisions lies in the way they applied settled principles of recognition to test the force of an annulment judgment abroad. Proceeding within the Gazprombankframework, the Dutch courts did not revisit the merits of the Indian fraud findings, consistent with the prohibition on révision au fond. They first asked whether the Liquidation Ruling and the Annulment Ruling were capable of recognition in the Netherlands at all. Once the liquidation proceedings were found not to meet minimum standards of due process, the later Annulment Ruling, founded on those findings, could not operate as a conclusive bar to enforcement in the Netherlands. The Supreme Court’s dismissal of Antrix’s appeal in cassation has now given finality to that approach.
29. The wider lesson is a practical one. If findings on fraud, public policy and finality are to carry weight abroad, the process by which they are reached must also command confidence in foreign jurisdictions. In such cases, the international enforceability of an award may turn not only on the award itself, but also on whether the surrounding judicial process is seen as fair, reasoned and procedurally robust. For award creditors, award debtors and state-owned entities alike, the case therefore underlines that, in cross border enforcement, what must travel is not only the award, but also the credibility of the judicial record that follows it.