I. INTRODUCTION

1. The DIFC’s conduit jurisdiction has long been one of its most attractive features. Its distinctive value lies in allowing the DIFC Courts to recognise and enforce foreign judgments and awards even where there is no separate territorial nexus or no assets located within the DIFC, allowing a judgment-creditor to obtain recognition and enforcement in the DIFC, and then pursue execution elsewhere. Singularity has previously opined on the broad implications of  the DIFC conduit for enforcement within and outside the UAE.^[1] In recent months, however, the continued existence of that jurisdiction has come under renewed scrutiny, particularly following the promulgation of the New Courts Law No. 2 of 2025 (“New Courts Law”) which replaced the old Judicial Authority Law and the old Courts Law. The New Courts Law appeared, at least on one view, to recast the statutory language through which the DIFC Courts’ enforcement powers had previously been understood.
2. That prompted some doubt as to whether conduit jurisdiction still survived. In Trafigura v Gupta, a case concerning the recognition and enforcement of an English worldwide freezing order, the CFI initially ruled that Article 31 introduced “a new administration of enforcement” and that earlier case law decided under the previous regime does not apply to the interpretation of the New Courts Law.^[2] On that basis, the DIFC was treated as a self-contained enforcement forum requiring a direct nexus. The CA reversed this decision, holding that assets within the jurisdiction were not needed while seeking interim measures in the DIFC in support of foreign proceedings. That decision appeared to restore the orthodox position.^[3]
3. Even so, uncertainty persisted. In Ostin v Oleda, although the judgment-creditor successfully enforced an onshore Dubai judgment in the DIFC, the CFI limited an order for the examination of the judgment debtor under RDC Part 50 to information pertaining to assets within the DIFC. The CFI reasoned that information about non-DIFC assets should be sought before the onshore Dubai courts where those assets were situated.^[4] That reasoning sat uneasily with the broader approach reflected in Trafigura.
4. The recent decision of the CFI in Timothy Hugh Christian Taylor v Arlette Joelle Marie Madeleine Yao Affi (“Timothy Hugh”) ^[5] addresses that tension directly. In doing so, it provides the clearest recent confirmation that the DIFC’s conduit jurisdiction remains intact under the New Courts Law.

II. BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5. In Timothy Hugh, the CFI issued orders in relation to the claimant’s applications to recognise and enforce two matrimonial orders of the English courts (“DIFC Enforcement Order”) and to subsequently appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution (“DIFC Receivership Order”). Unsurprisingly, the defendant applied to set aside both. Of the four grounds initially pursued by the defendant, only two were live before the CFI by the hearing: first, whether the DIFC Court had jurisdiction under Article 31(4) of the New Courts Law to recognise and enforce the English orders absent assets in the DIFC; and second, whether the receivership order issued by the DIFC Courts by way of equitable execution ought to stand. These grounds are considered in detail below.
6. Separately, the CFI rejected the two other grounds – being, that the claimant procured the DIFC orders by an alleged lack of full and frank disclosure; and that the DIFC orders were against the public policy of the UAE – raised by the defendant. The CFI noted that it was aware of the allegations of bigamy and/or fraud and that any argument based on a failure to disclose these allegations could not succeed. The CFI observed that the English court had already considered these allegations, determined they lacked both substance and validity, and ultimately issued its matrimonial orders rejecting these allegations. As a result, the CFI considered that these matters were res judicataand that the defendant could not circumvent the English court’s conclusions on these allegations by relying on UAE public policy before the CFI.^[6]

III. THE CFI’S DECISION

7. The CFI rejected the defendant’s attempts to set aside the DIFC orders.
8. In terms of its jurisdiction challenge to the DIFC Enforcement Order, the defendant argued that Article 31(4) of the New Courts Law had to be read in the context of the remainder of the provision, together with Articles 14(C)(2) and 15 of the New Courts Law, and that the expression “inside the DIFC” required assets within the DIFC against which an enforcement writ could be issued.^[7]
9. Dismissing this, the CFI held that a bare reading of Article 31(4) gave the Enforcement Judge jurisdiction to enforce final and interim decisions of foreign courts “inside the DIFC” without any textual requirement that assets already be located there. The CFI further contextualised Article 32 which envisages that the Enforcement Judge could seek the assistance of onshore Dubai Courts to enforce writs of enforcement in relation to those assets situated onshore. The CFI concluded that taken together, neither provision contemplated a necessity for assets within the DIFC and that nothing in the New Courts Law restricted the issuance of the DIFC Enforcement Order where no assets were found in the DIFC.^[8]
10. The CFI was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that read with Articles 14(C)(2) and 15 of the New Courts Law, Article 31(4) contained any requirement to demonstrate assets within the jurisdiction. The CFI observed that Article 14(C)(2) did no more than simply provide the DIFC Courts with the discretion to decline jurisdiction over a claim which had already been the subject of a final judgment of another court which was capable of enforcement in the DIFC. The CFI noted that this provision did not assist in deciding which final judgements of other courts were capable of enforcement in the DIFC. Similarly, the CFI did not find Article 15 of the New Courts Law to support the defendant’s interpretation – it found Article 15, as considered in Trafigura, was concerned with, inter alia the DIFC Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for interim or precautionary measures relating to proceedings outside the DIFC “provided that the suitable precautionary measures are taken within the DIFC” by reference to the correct translation from the Arabic and the intent of the legislation.^[9]
11. Relying on Trafigura, the CFI remarked that the CA had been clear in holding that in the context of interim measures sought in the DIFC, the enforcement of a foreign judgment inside the DIFC did not require there to be assets in the jurisdiction. The CFI observed that this had equally been the position under the earlier regime and held that the authorities which confirmed that there was no legislative requirement to show assets in the DIFC in order to seek the recognition and enforcement of foreign court orders in the DIFC, continued to remain the correct position of law under the New Courts Law.^[10] While the CFI noted that these decisions, including Trafigura, had been issued in the context of interim measures, it found that the same principles would apply a fortiori to final orders – any argument to the contrary was bizarre and made no sense. In the present dispute, the DIFC Enforcement Order had made the English matrimonial orders enforceable in the same manner as orders of the DIFC Court. The CFI noted that none of the directions contained in the DIFC Enforcement Order – restraining the defendant from carrying out certain actions in relation to property in onshore Dubai; requiring her to take various steps concerning the sale of such property; and requiring her to pay portions of the sale proceeds to the claimant – per se related to the existence of assets in the DIFC. However, the CFI observed that should monies subsequently come within the DIFC, the Enforcement order could be executed against her – this was the difference between enforcement and execution proceedings in the DIFC. ^[11]
12. The CFI further rejected the defendant’s reliance on Ostin v Oleda. Noting that this decision neither referred to the CA’s analysis in Trafigura nor provided any further reasoning of its own, the CFI remained unpersuaded by what it termed was “essentially an unreasoned decision.” ^[12]
13. Challenging the validity of the DIFC Receivership order, the defendant pressed that the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution was only to be exercised where there existed some hindrance or difficulty with execution at law. The defendant asserted that the claimant had not demonstrated any basis for the appointment of a receiver when the English matrimonial orders could be directly enforced in the onshore Dubai courts. ^[13]
14. Upholding the DIFC Receivership Order, the CFI rejected the defendant’s argument that such an order ought not to be issued where there was neither hindrance nor difficulty with enforcing the English matrimonial orders before the onshore Dubai Courts. The CFI found that there existed a real risk that the defendant would dissipate her assets to avoid complying with the English matrimonial orders and/or the DIFC Enforcement Order and had already breached these in dealing with the property in onshore Dubai. The CFI held that the only practical way of enforcing the DIFC Enforcement Order was by appointing a Receiver – an appointment, the CFI found to be urgently needed given that the defendant had subsequently created encumbrances on the property in onshore Dubai and extracted large sums of money from it. Curing any procedural irregularities that might have arisen, the CFI refused to set aside the DIFC Receivership Order. ^[14]
15. The defendant had in this case sought to have its own appeal conjoined to an appeal which was understood to be pending against the CFI’s decision in Ostin v Oleda. However, the CFI refused to grant the defendant permission to appeal its order as it would have no real prospect of success.

IV. CONCLUSION

16. The significance of Timothy Hugh lies in its clear confirmation that the 2025 Court Law did not extinguish the conduit jurisdiction in the DIFC. Addressing the point directly, it explains that Article 31(4) does not require assets to be located in the DIFC before a foreign judgment may be recognised and enforced there, while Article 32 confirms that DIFC process may then be taken for execution before onshore Dubai courts.
17. Drawing on the interpretative reasoning adopted by the CA in Trafigura, the CFI in Timothy Hugh left no tenable basis for an anti-conduit approach in the DIFC. It supports the view that the DIFC remains available as a forum for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, whether interim or final, even where the relevant assets are outside the DIFC.
18. That said, Timothy Hughand Ostin are both CFI decisions and one does not formally overrule the other. However, Timothy Hugh expressly anchors its reasoning in the CA’s decision in Trafigura which gives it more doctrinal footing.