I. INTRODUCTION

1. In recent decisions, the DIFC Courts have significantly refined the contours of conduit jurisdiction under the new DIFC Courts Law No. 2 of 2025 (“New Courts Law”). Singularity’s insight on The Evolving Landscape of Freestanding Injunctions in the DIFC discusses how decisions in Trafigura and Techteryx have confirmed that the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction under Article 15(4) of the New Courts Law to grant interim or precautionary measures in support of foreign proceedings, including freezing and ancillary disclosure orders, where those proceedings may result in a judgment capable of recognition or enforcement in the DIFC.
2. Against that backdrop, the DIFC Court of First Instance (“CFI”) decision by HE Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi in Orabelle v Orzenia ARB 007/2026 (30 January 2026) (“Orabelle”) raised a potentially significant challenge. The CFI there dismissed an urgent ex-parte application for a worldwide freezing order (“WFO”) and asset disclosure order in support of a prospective Paris-seated arbitration. The Court held that the applicant had failed to establish the statutory jurisdictional gateway under Article 15(4) of the New Courts Law, principally because it had not identified any assets, property, parties, or other identifiable nexus with the DIFC.
3. If taken at its widest, Orabelle threatened to introduce an asset or territorial nexus requirement into Article 15(4), notwithstanding the broader approach reflected in Trafigura and the DIFC Courts’ developing conduit jurisprudence. That made the decision significant, even though its reasoning has since been reconsidered and confined. This alert examines Orabelle as the high-water mark of that restrictive approach, the difficulty it created for interim relief in support of foreign arbitration, and how subsequent DIFC authority has addressed the threat it posed.

II. BACKGROUND

4. In Orabelle, the dispute arose out of an asset management agreement between a UAE-based investment solution provider and an Osprey-based legal entity. The agreement provided for Paris-seated arbitration. In late November 2025, the respondent took steps to terminate the contractual relationship. The applicant alleged that the respondent removed its access to systems, premises, and banking permissions, including a UAE bank account. According to the applicant, these steps constituted an “early termination” of the agreement and triggered entitlement to a termination indemnity.
5. Prior to commencing arbitration, the applicant applied to the DIFC Courts seeking urgent ex-parte relief including: (a) a WFO up to USD 8,071,581.39; and (b) an asset disclosure order requiring the respondent to disclose worldwide assets. At the hearing, the applicant relied on a draft request for arbitration and undertakings to commence the arbitral proceedings. It did not, however, identify assets within the DIFC or any other concrete connection between the respondent, the dispute, the relief sought, and the DIFC.

III. THE CFI’S ANALYSIS: NO JURISDICTION

6. The CFI dismissed the application in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction. It focused on Article 15(4) of the New Courts Law. Article 15(4) provides jurisdiction for interim measures related to “applications, claims, or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC.”
7. The key issue the CFI considered was whether the requirement that the measures be sought “within the DIFC” had been satisfied. The Court found that it had not, because the applicant had failed to identify any assets, property or any other connecting factor linking the respondent to the DIFC. The Court made clear that the phrase “within the DIFC” did not simply refer to the location of the Court issuing the order. Instead, it required a genuine jurisdictional connection with the DIFC.
8. The applicant argued for a broader reading. On its case, a “precautionary measure within the DIFC” meant an order made by the DIFC Courts, regardless of whether any assets were shown to be within the DIFC. This sought to align Article 15(4) with Trafigura, where the Court of Appeal held that Article 15(4) does not require assets to be located within the DIFC and instead may support freezing and disclosure orders in aid of foreign proceedings which would yield a judgment that could subsequently be enforced in the DIFC. This borrows from reasoning in previous authorities under the Old Court Law such as Carmon v Cuenda demonstrating a uniform understanding of the position of law in the DIFC (see our alert).
9. The CFI expressly rejected that construction. It considered that, if the phrase “within the DIFC” merely referred to the Court making the order, the words would add little or nothing, since any order made by the DIFC Courts would necessarily be made by a DIFC Court. The Court therefore treated the words “within the DIFC” as imposing a statutory condition requiring an identifiable DIFC nexus.
10. The CFI sought to distinguish Trafigura on the basis that Trafigura concerned interim relief in support of foreign court proceedings, whereas Orabelle concerned a prospective foreign arbitration that had not yet commenced. The Court appears to have regarded that distinction as significant because, absent a commenced arbitration, there was no existing proceeding capable of leading to recognition or enforcement in the DIFC and no identified DIFC assets against which any future award might ultimately be enforced. It also emphasised that the applicant could not identify any assets, property, parties, or other connection with the DIFC, and that the relief sought was directed at assets located outside the DIFC. In those circumstances, the Court concluded that the application lacked the territorial nexus required by the words “within the DIFC” and that the jurisdictional gateway in Article 15(4) had not been satisfied.

IV. THE TENSION WITH TRAFIGURA

11. The difficulty with Orabelleis that Trafigura had already considered Article 15(4) in the context of interim relief in support of foreign proceedings. In Trafigura, the Court of Appeal held that Article 15(4), read with the opening words of Article 15, conferred jurisdiction to grant interim or precautionary measures related to proceedings outside the DIFC. It further held that the jurisdiction extended to disclosure of assets and other information relevant to the conduct of foreign proceedings and enforcement of any judgment arising from them, whether in the DIFC or in the foreign jurisdiction.
12. That reasoning is difficult to reconcile with Orabelle, Article 15(4) expressly refers not only to foreign court proceedings, but also to “current or future arbitral proceedings” brought outside the DIFC. The fact that the arbitration in Orabelle had not yet commenced may have been relevant to discretion, evidential sufficiency, urgency, or the appropriateness of ex parte worldwide relief. It is less obvious that it should have defeated jurisdiction altogether.
13. Orabelletherefore raised an important question: if Article 15(4) does not require assets or a territorial nexus in the context of foreign court proceedings, should a materially different rule apply merely because the foreign proceeding is a non-commenced arbitration rather than court litigation, particularly where the statutory text expressly covers future arbitral proceedings?

V. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS: ORABELLE LIMITED

14. Similar asset-nexus arguments have also arisen in the enforcement context under Article 31(4) of the New Courts Law, which uses the phrase “inside the DIFC”. As discussed in Singularity’s alert on Timothy Hugh v Arlette Affi [2025] DIFC ENF 271 (11 March 2026), H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke rejected the suggestion that foreign judgments may be recognised and enforced in the DIFC only where assets are already located there. In doing so, the CFI declined to follow Ostin v Oleda [2025] DIFC ENF 185 (25 November 2025) (“Ostin”), where H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser had limited a judgment debtor examination under RDC Part 50 to information concerning assets within the DIFC. Although these cases arose under Article 31(4), rather than Article 15(4), they form part of the same broader trend against reading an asset requirement into the words “within” or “inside” the DIFC.
15. The more direct treatment of Orabellecame in Ovya v Oshie ARB 023/2026 (24 April 2026) (“Ovya”), a decision of H.E. Justice Mark Pelling KC. This too concerned an ex parte application for a WFO under Article 15(4). After the hearing, the applicant placed Orabelle before the Court through further submissions. The Court remarked that Orabelle should have been drawn to its attention at the ex parte hearing as part of the applicant’s duty of full and frank disclosure. However, it concluded that the decision would not have changed the outcome. The Court observed that Trafigura was a binding Court of Appeal decision on Article 15(4). It considered Orabelle to be inconsistent with Trafigura, or at least realistically arguably inconsistent with Trafigura and decided per incuriam. The Court further stated that it was not convinced there was a credible distinction between the two decisions, and that Orabelle should not be followed for so long as Trafigura remains authoritative.
16. Orlaghv Orchid CA 001/2026 (6 May 2026) (“Orlagh”), discussed in detail in Singularity’s alert, is the appeal from Ostin. There, the Court of Appeal rejected an asset-based limitation on the DIFC Courts’ enforcement powers under Article 31(4) and RDC Part 50. In the case, Orabelle had been relied on in support of an asset-nexus limitation, albeit in the Article 31(4) enforcement context. The Court of Appeal observed that Orabelle may have identified factors relevant to the Court’s discretion to refuse ex parte relief but went further than necessary in treating those factors as defeating jurisdiction. It treats the decision in Orabelle as potentially right on the facts, because the relief was unsupported and speculative, but wrong if read as laying down a hard jurisdictional requirement that DIFC assets must be identified before freezing or disclosure orders can be made.
17. The position emerging from these decisions is therefore clear. Together, they confine Orabelleto its facts and preserve the broader approach reflected in Trafigura.

VI. CONCLUSION

18. Orabelle cannot be understood as a surviving jurisdictional limit on the DIFC Courts’ power under Article 15(4). The provision expressly extends to interim measures in support of “future arbitral proceedings”, and the better view after Trafigura, Timothy Hugh, Ovya, and Orlagh is that neither the absence of commenced arbitration nor the absence of identified DIFC assets is, by itself, a jurisdictional bar. To that extent, Orabelle’s broader asset-nexus reasoning has been substantially confined.
19. What Orabelle does remain is the strongest judicial endorsement to date of the restrictive argument that Article 15(4) may require some identifiable connection with the DIFC before interim relief can be granted. Although that argument has not survived as a jurisdictional threshold, the concerns animating it may still matter at the discretionary stage. This is particularly so where relief is sought urgently, ex parte, worldwide in scope, and in support of an arbitration that has not yet commenced.
20. A prospective arbitration may still raise difficult questions for the Court’s discretion. However, the unresolved questions are not jurisdictional, they concern evidential sufficiency, discretion, and full and frank disclosure: how concrete must the anticipated arbitration be; how soon must it be commenced; what evidence is required to show that proceedings are genuinely intended; whether any delay in commencing arbitration undermines urgency; and whether the absence of identified DIFC assets or another DIFC connection affects the proportionality of worldwide relief. On that basis, Orabelle is best understood not as a limit on Article 15(4) jurisdiction, but as a reminder that future-arbitration applications may attract closer scrutiny before interim relief is granted.

Authors: Khushboo Sharma, Natasha Kavalakkat & Prateek Bagaria