I. INTRODUCTION

1. Jurisdiction in the DIFC Courts has long been a contested and closely watched subject. Much of the debate has concerned cases where there is no obvious or direct DIFC nexus, and parties seek to rely on the “any written law” gateway – formerly Article 5(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law (“JAL”), and now Article 14(7) of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 concerning the DIFC Courts (“New Courts Law”). That line of authority has generated recurring questions about the limits of the DIFC Courts’ role, particularly in recognition, enforcement and so-called conduit jurisdiction cases.
2. Separately, however, a different set of cases arises under the nexus-based gateways. These cases do not depend on a freestanding gateway, but on whether the dispute is sufficiently connected to the DIFC through the status of a party, the nature of the activity, the place of performance, or the operation of DIFC laws. Every so often, a case tests the outer edge of those gateways. Emirates NBD Bank PJSC v Rashed Abulaziz Almakhawi and Others[2025] DIFC CFI 039 is one such case. The judgment was issued by the DIFC Court of First Instance (“CFI”) on 3 April 2026.
3. The question before the CFI was whether Emirates NBD Bank PJSC (“ENBD”), an onshore UAE bank, fell within the DIFC Courts’ exclusive jurisdiction because it was a recognised member of Nasdaq Dubai, which in turn falls within the DIFC regulatory framework. Apart from that, the parties were based outside the DIFC; the underlying judgment was a Dubai Court judgment; the relevant alleged asset transfers occurred outside the DIFC and across several jurisdictions; and the claims were advanced under UAE law. The central issue was whether ENBD qualified as a “DIFC Establishment” or “Licensed DIFC Establishment” for the purposes of Article 14(A)(1) of the New Courts Law.
4. The CFI also addressed further issues of practical importance: whether the DIFC Courts may decline jurisdiction in favour of the Dubai Courts on forum non conveniensgrounds, and how delay, notice, and urgency are to be approached in applications for worldwide freezing relief.

II. BACKGROUND

5. The dispute arose from ENBD’s efforts to enforce a substantial judgment debt against Mr Rashed Abulaziz Almakhawi. Mr Almakhawi had issued a personal guarantee in favour of ENBD to secure facilities extended to System Construct LLC, a UAE company of which he was the sole beneficial owner. Following System Construct’s liquidation, ENBD pursued proceedings before the Dubai Courts, obtained a precautionary attachment in March 2018, and ultimately obtained a final judgment from the Dubai Court of Cassation on 7 July 2019 for approximately USD 90 million.
6. ENBD alleged that, while these liabilities were crystallising and enforcement steps were being pursued, Mr. Almakhawi caused substantial assets to be transferred to his children and to offshore structures. These included transfers of cash, interests connected with real estate, and later movements of funds which ENBD alleged were intended to place assets beyond the reach of creditors. ENBD had also pursued enforcement-related proceedings in several jurisdictions, including England, Switzerland, Jersey and New York. The Jersey Court of Appeal found that Mr Almakhawi had transferred his cash and assets to put them beyond his creditors. Additionally, the English High Court found that he had created a document to manufacture an inheritance-planning justification for the transfers, and that this document was not genuine.
7. In April 2025, ENBD commenced proceedings before the DIFC CFI against Mr Almakhawi and his children (collectively, the “Defendants”). It sought, among other reliefs, recovery of the Dubai Judgment debt, orders in respect of the alleged asset transfers, and declarations that certain transactions were sham or otherwise liable to be unwound under UAE law. Pending determination of those claims, ENBD applied for a worldwide freezing order, relying inter aliaon findings made in some of the foreign proceedings.
8. The Defendants resisted the freezing order and challenged the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts. Their objection was that the dispute had no sufficient connection with the DIFC – the parties were based outside the DIFC, the underlying judgment was a Dubai Court judgment, the relevant alleged transfers had occurred outside the DIFC and across several jurisdictions, and the claims were advanced under UAE law.
9. ENBD’s response was that jurisdiction did not depend on those factual connections. It relied instead on its status as a recognised member of Nasdaq Dubai. Nasdaq Dubai is an exchange operating within the DIFC regulatory framework, and a market participant may act as a member of that exchange only if it is recognised by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (“DFSA”) under the applicable DIFC laws and regulations. ENBD argued that this recognition was not a remote or incidental connection. It was the permission by which ENBD was able to carry on activity in or through the DIFC-regulated market. ENBD argued that this brought it within the definitions of “DIFC Establishment” and “Licensed DIFC Establishment” under the New Courts Law, thereby engaging the DIFC Courts’ exclusive jurisdiction under Article 14(A)(1).
10. The CFI therefore had to decide whether Nasdaq Dubai Recognised Member status was sufficient to create a jurisdictional nexus under the New Courts Law.

III. THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION

11. The jurisdictional challenge turned on Article 14(A)(1) of the New Courts Law. That provision confers exclusive jurisdiction on the DIFC Courts over civil and commercial claims involving DIFC Bodies, DIFC Establishments, and Licensed DIFC Establishments. ENBD’s case was that, by reason of its Nasdaq Dubai Recognised Member status, it fell within the latter two categories.
12. The Defendants argued that this was an overextension of the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction. They submitted that ENBD was an onshore UAE bank, with no relevant branch, office or incorporation in the DIFC. The claim did not arise from any trade or transaction on Nasdaq Dubai. Nor was the dispute otherwise connected to ENBD’s activity as a market participant. On their case, the mere fact that ENBD was recognised by the DFSA for the purposes of Nasdaq Dubai membership could not transform a largely onshore enforcement dispute into one falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts.
13. The Defendants also relied on the change in statutory language under the New Courts Law. Under the former JAL a “Licensed DIFC Establishment” was defined broadly by reference to entities licensed, registered or authorised by the DFSA to provide financial services or conduct other activities in accordance with DIFC laws. The earlier Larmag Holdings BV v First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC (“Larmag”), line of decisions had treated DFSA-recognised Nasdaq Dubai members as Licensed DIFC Establishments^[1] .
14. The Defendants argued that the New Courts Law had narrowed that position. Article 2 now defines a “DIFC Establishment” as any entity or business established, licensed, registered, or permitted to operate or carry on any activity in or through the DIFC pursuant to DIFC Laws and Regulations. It separately defines a “Licensed DIFC Establishment” as any entity or business licensed, registered, authorised, or recognised by the DFSA to carry on “Financial” or “Ancillary Services” under Law No. 5 of 2021 and the DIFC Laws.
15. On the Defendants’ case, ENBD’s recognition as a Nasdaq Dubai member did not satisfy either definition. They relied on DFSA’s statement that a person recognised by DFSA, and operating in accordance with the DFSA’s Recognition module, is not regarded as conducting financial services “in or from the DIFC” ^[2] .They also argued that a DFSA-recognised member necessarily carries on business and has its registered office outside the DIFC ^[3] . Such members were therefore, on their case, outside the relevant DIFC regulatory perimeter and could not qualify as DIFC Establishments or Licensed DIFC Establishments.
16. ENBD’s response was that the Defendants’ argument placed too much weight on the absence of a conventional territorial connection and on the DFSA’s regulatory statement. As to “DIFC Establishment”, ENBD argued that its Nasdaq Dubai membership amounted to permission to carry on activity in or through the DIFC pursuant to DIFC laws. Nasdaq Dubai is a DIFC-regulated exchange, and ENBD could act as a member of that market only because it was recognised by the DFSA.
17. As to “Licensed DIFC Establishment”, ENBD argued that the definition expressly includes entities “recognised” by the DFSA. It further contended that “Financial Services” is defined broadly and non-exhaustively under the New Courts Law, including financial activities and services. On ENBD’s case, trading in financial products and promoting financial products as a Nasdaq Dubai member fell naturally within that broad formulation.
18. ENBD also submitted that the DFSA’s statement on recognised members did not determine the jurisdictional question. That statement may have explained the regulatory treatment of recognised members, but it could not control the Court’s construction of the New Courts Law. The question whether ENBD was a DIFC Establishment or Licensed DIFC Establishment was ultimately one of statutory interpretation for the DIFC Courts.

IV. THE CFI’S ANALYSIS: REGULATORY RECOGNITION AS JURISDICTIONAL NEXUS

19. The CFI began with the foundational proposition that the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts is entirely statutory, e., unless a claim satisfies one of the statutory gateways, the Court will not have jurisdiction^[4] . The question was therefore whether ENBD’s position as a Nasdaq Dubai Recognised Member brought it within the relevant statutory definitions.
20. The CFI held that there was no material difference, for present purposes, between the former jurisdictional regime under the JAL and Article 14(A)(1) of the New Courts Law. The earlier Larmag line of authorities concerning DFSA-recognised market participants therefore remained relevant and continue to inform the position under the New Courts Law. In finding so, the CFI rejected a narrow or literalist reading of the statutory definitions, and noted that the Court must look to the substance of the component parts of the regime, keeping in mind the legislative intention^[5] .The question was not whether ENBD had a physical presence in the DIFC, or whether the immediate dispute arose from a Nasdaq Dubai transaction. The question was whether ENBD was permitted or recognised under DIFC laws to carry on activity in or through the DIFC. On that question, the Court considered ENBD’s Nasdaq Dubai membership to be decisive.
21. The CFI held it was “unarguable” that ENBD did not qualify as a DIFC Establishment. Breaking the definition into its elements, it found: First, ENBD was a “business”. Second, its ability to act as a member of Nasdaq Dubai depended on DFSA recognition under the DIFC legal and regulatory framework. Nasdaq Dubai was not merely treated as an external exchange with an incidental commercial link to the DIFC, it was treated as part of the DIFC regulatory ecosystem. ENBD’s recognised status was therefore a permission to operate or carry on activity in or through that ecosystem. Relying on Corinth Pipeworks v Barclays Bank, the CFI reaffirmed that once an entity is a DIFC Establishment, the DIFC Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims relating to it, regardless of where its branches operate^[6] .On that basis, the CFI held that ENBD was a DIFC Establishment. The CFI recognised concerns that this principle might apply too broadly, including to employment disputes, but found those concerns to be exaggerated and not strong enough to deny jurisdiction.
22. The CFI also held that ENBD was a Licensed DIFC Establishment. The Court was not persuaded that the DFSA’s statement on recognised members displaced this conclusion. That statement addressed the regulatory consequences of recognition; it did not determine the jurisdictional meaning of the New Courts Law. The construction of the statutory jurisdictional gateways remained a matter for the Court. Applying Larmag, the Court concluded that trading on NASDAQ with DIFC customers plainly amounts to conducting financial services in or from the DIFC^[7] .It emphasised that ENBD’s ability to carry out these activities depended entirely on DFSA recognition under the Markets Law, meaning the activities were conducted within a regulatory framework and thus “in a regulatory sense” within the DIFC. The CFI also pointed to ENBD’s ongoing and significant market activity, including a recent bond listing, to underscore the disconnect in the Defendants’ position.
23. This is the core significance of the decision. The decision therefore sits within, but is distinct from, the broader debate on DIFC jurisdiction under the New Courts Law. Singularity’s insight JAL 2.0: The DIFC Courts Reboot, observed that the New Courts Law introduced structural reforms and jurisdictional clarifications while codifying several established judicial practices. Emirates NBD v Almakhawiis a concrete example of that continuity: at least in relation to recognised market participants, the CFI was not prepared to treat the New Courts Law as having narrowed the earlier jurisdictional position.

V. OTHER KEY FINDINGS

A. Forum non conveniens and intra-UAE jurisdiction

24. Having found that Article 14(A)(1) was capable of being engaged, the CFI considered the Defendants’ alternative argument that the Court should nevertheless decline to exercise jurisdiction. The Defendants submitted that the Dubai Courts were the more appropriate forum. The parties were based in Dubai outside the DIFC; the relevant events occurred outside the DIFC; the claims were governed by UAE law; much of the evidence was likely to be in Arabic; and the proceedings were, in substance, concerned with alleged evasion of a Dubai Court judgment.
25. The Defendants’ broader concern was that ENBD’s construction of Article 14(A)(1) would give the DIFC Courts a gateway of potentially exceptional breadth. If a recognised Nasdaq Dubai member were a DIFC Establishment or Licensed DIFC Establishment for all purposes, then claims by or against that entity could fall within DIFC exclusive jurisdiction even where the dispute had no other connection with the DIFC. The Defendants pointed to examples such as tort claims or employment claims involving an onshore branch of the bank.
26. On that basis, the Defendants submitted that forum non conveniens should operate as a control mechanism. They relied on the DIFC Court Rules, Part 12.1(2) and the Spiliadatest: first, whether there is another forum clearly and distinctly more appropriate; and secondly, whether justice nevertheless requires the claim to proceed in the DIFC. They argued that the Dubai Courts plainly satisfied the first stage^[8] .
27. The defendants recognised that this argument faced difficulty in light of earlier DIFC authority. In IGPL v Standard Chartered Bank, the DIFC Court of Appeal had endorsed the position that forum non conveniensdoes not apply where the alternative forum is another UAE court^[9] . The Defendants argued that the New Courts Law, and the creation of the Conflict of Jurisdiction Tribunal (“CJT”), justified revisiting that position.
28. The CFI rejected that argument. It reaffirmed the position in IGPL v Standard Chartered Bankthat forum non conveniens has no application where the alternative forum is another UAE court. The CFI treated the word “exclusive” in Article 14(A)(1) as deliberate. Once the DIFC Courts’ exclusive jurisdiction is engaged, it is not open to the Court to decline jurisdiction merely because another UAE court appears more naturally connected to the dispute. The creation of the CJT did not alter that conclusion. The CFI treated it as confirming that conflicts between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts are to be addressed through the statutory mechanism established for that purpose, not through a free-standing common law discretion to decline jurisdiction.
29. This point should be understood against the broader context of Dubai’s dual-court framework. Singularity’s earlier insight in Untangling Conflict of Jurisdiction between DIFC and Onshore Courtsnotes that conflicts between the DIFC Courts and Dubai’s onshore judiciary have persisted in practice, particularly in matters of enforcement and arbitral supervision, and that mechanisms such as the CJT are intended to reconcile judicial competence within that dual-court structure. Emirates NBD v Almakhawi applies that logic in the context of Article 14(A)(1): the DIFC Court does not decline its own exclusive jurisdiction simply because the Dubai Courts are said to be the more appropriate forum.

B. WORLDWIDE FREEZING RELIEF: DELAY, NOTICE, AND URGENCY

30. The second important aspect of the judgment concerns the worldwide freezing order. ENBD sought freezing relief against the Defendants pending determination of its claims. The Defendants resisted the application on several grounds, including delay, lack of urgency, the fact that the application was brought on notice, absence of DIFC assets, alleged enforceability concerns, and the intrusive nature of the relief sought.
31. The CFI granted the order. It held that ENBD had established a good arguable case and that there was solid evidence of a real risk of dissipation. In reaching that conclusion, the CFI placed weight on the existing Dubai judgment, ENBD’s enforcement efforts in other jurisdictions, and findings in foreign proceedings which supported ENBD’s case that assets had been moved beyond the reach of creditors.
32. The CFI’s treatment of delay is important. The application was not brought immediately after the relevant asset transfers. The defendants argued that this undermined any suggestion of urgency or real dissipation risk. The CFI did not accept that delay, without more, defeated the application. It treated the central question as whether there was solid evidence of a real risk that a judgment would go unsatisfied by reason of unjustified dissipation. Delay was relevant to that assessment and to the Court’s discretion, but it was not a standalone threshold bar^[10] .
33. The more careful way to state the principle is this: a freezing order application is not confined to cases of immediate emergency, nor is it necessarily defeated because it is brought on notice rather than ex parte. Urgency, delay, and notice remain relevant and may matter in an appropriate case. But where there is solid evidence of a real risk of dissipation, the Court will ask whether the delay is sufficiently inordinate and inexcusable to justify refusing relief.
34. The fact that ENBD’s application was brought on notice was also not fatal. Parties resisting a freeing injunction often argue that an inter partesapplication is inconsistent with the urgency that usually accompanies freezing relief. The CFI did not treat the point that way. An ex parte application may be appropriate where advance notice would itself create a dissipation risk. But the fact that a claimant proceeds on notice does not mean that there is no real risk of dissipation, nor does it preclude relief if the evidential threshold is otherwise met.
35. The CFI also rejected the argument that the absence of assets in the DIFC prevented the grant of relief. In doing so, the judgment is consistent with the wider line of DIFC authority on asset-preservation measures. Singularity’s The Evolving Landscape of Freestanding Injunctionsin the DIFC discusses how Carmon v Cuenda and Trafigura v Gupta and Techteryx v Aria Commodities have shaped the DIFC Courts’ modern injunctive jurisdiction, particularly the use of suitable precautionary measures to protect anticipated awards or judgments enforceable in the DIFC.
36. The point also connects with Singularity’s alert on Timothy Hugh v Arlette Affi.There, the focus was enforcement without assets in the DIFC. Here, the context was different: the Court was dealing with interim asset-preservation relief in proceedings within its own jurisdiction. But the underlying theme is similar. The absence of assets within the DIFC is not, without more, a complete answer to the DIFC Courts’ enforcement or protective jurisdiction.

VI. CONCLUSION

37. Emirates NBD v Almakhawiis principally significant for its treatment of Nasdaq Dubai Recognised Member status as a jurisdictional nexus under the New Courts Law. The CFI accepted that ENBD’s DFSA recognition, and its ability to participate in a DIFC-regulated market by virtue of that recognition, were sufficient to bring it within the definitions of “DIFC Establishment” and “Licensed DIFC Establishment” for the purposes of Article 14(A)(1).
38. The decision is important because the dispute otherwise had limited connection with the DIFC. The parties were based outside the DIFC, the underlying judgment was a Dubai Court judgment, the claims were advanced under UAE law, and the alleged asset transfers occurred outside the DIFC and across several jurisdictions. The Court nevertheless held that ENBD’s recognised status supplied the relevant statutory nexus.
39. The judgment also confirms two related points. First, the DIFC Courts will not decline jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds merely because the Dubai Courts appear more naturally connected to the dispute – forum non conveniensis not a general safety valve once Article 14(A)(1) is engaged. Second, the judgment provides useful guidance on worldwide freezing relief – delay, lack of conventional urgency, and the fact that an application is brought on notice are relevant considerations, but they are not necessarily fatal where there is solid evidence of a real risk of dissipation. The absence of assets within the DIFC is also not a bar to relief.
40. The broader point is that DIFC jurisdiction is not only territorial. It may arise through status, regulation and statutory design. For financial institutions and market participants operating within the DIFC regulatory ecosystem, the decision is a reminder that recognised status may carry litigation consequences. For judgment creditors, it also confirms the continued utility of the DIFC Courts in cross-border enforcement and asset-preservation strategy.

Authors: Shrilakshmi Sankaranarayanan, Natasha Kavalakkat, and Prateek Bagaria